Talk:Lower House of States

I think the easiest way to discuss the idea is to break it down into component parts for individual discussion, so I'ma set up a few subheadings here for things that are concerning me with the idea. Feel free to make sub-points to these and throw in your own as well, just remember to tag your comments so we know whose are whose. -Unreason

Electoral Process

• The abdication of democratic input into the lower house. Representatives appointed by representatives can often be less politically motivated in their actions, but also often find more freedom to abuse the position. This may also be the defining feature which opponents to the idea will use against it in the popular mind. Sub-categories below: -Unreason
  1. Checks/balances
     •  ??
  2. Popular confidence
     •  ??

I'd like to see some formal accountability introduced to the system. There are legal penalties and ramifications for corporate executives if they lie to their boards, shareholders, etc. But is there the same for politicians? They seem to get away with a lot more! --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

• Issues of state failure to elect representatives to the federal lower house. We're expecting divergent political parties to be able to elect 20 representatives from amongst themselves which is possibly an optimistic idea in itself. Deadlock solution ideas? -Unreason

I do kind of see this purely as a state issue. Basically let it be as simple as "each state may send up to 20 representatives to form Federal Parliament". While it's possible that a state might then send less than 20 (so as to send maximum from their own party, whilst not enabling any extra to go to the "opposition" (assuming such party structure were to continue), I expect that the public outcry would be a limiting factor there. Alternatively, just word it as "20 or nothing". If a state can't agree to send 20, then they get no chance at representation. (however, in this case I'd suggest that the state could have a chance to send again at the next beginning of sitting of parliament - maybe every 6 months or so?) --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

• The Queensland Exception. Should there be a constitutional clause in our theoretical constitution to allow for state governments that do not have a senate? We cannot guarantee that all states are always going to be bicameral. -Unreason

Hmm, the 20-or-nothing clause partially plays a role. Arguably the constitution could insist on reps coming from the state senates - thus "peer pressuring" them into bicameral systems. That denotes a lot of confidence that bicameral is ideal. --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

• Formation of cabinet. Should this be a post-selection election for the public to decide? Should the lower house form cabinet on its own initiative? Should they be elected individually and independently of the state representative selection process entirely? -Unreason

My thoughts merged into those of structure, below --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

Issues of Structure

• Our current government forms new deparments every election cycle. Theoretically this system would standardise department portfolios, but in a long-term perspective this seems unadaptive. Taking into account feasibility, and the issues above of election process, what is a sensible method of balancing standardisation and flexibility? -Unreason

An idea here - the cabinets are defined as needed by the upper house - ie, the "will of the people". But the ministers that head those cabinets and subsequently lead them - are an internal lower house initiative. The lower house may request to the upper house for the formation of a new cabinet, etc, but I think this would lead to departments maintaining more longevity and hopefully thus greater efficiency (rather than being changed on a whim of the government), whilst still allowing for an amount of flexibility to change. (in which case, should there be a limit to how often departments can change and be redefined? Once per sitting session? As often as the lower house can convince the upper house to pass a bill about it? Indeed, perhaps it should just be as simple as "Departments are created/changed/abolished by an act of parliament". The bill can come from either house, and must be passed by the senate. Thoughts? --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

• If the NT has state-standing, do we have any other territories than the ACT? Or did you have something else in mind there Nemo? Certainly, it allows for good representation if Australia should become expansionist. :P -Unreason

I'm thinking 20 per state (including NT), and 10 for all other territories - which is currently the ACT and also a few outliers (Norfolk Is?). How to ensure that an expansionist Australia defines new territories as 'states' rather than 'territories' however? --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

Head of State

This system isn't inherently monarchist or republican, but I tend towards an appointed head of state. Many republics successfully have a "voted in by two thirds of joint parliament sitting" or similar I believe, and am happy to consider such a system as being straight forwardly adaptable to here. (perhaps with the limitation that the candidates are chosen by the Senate before ratified by both. The idea there being that the Senate is the house of oversight/review, and the head of state is the ultimate embodiment of that idea. (and otherwise ceremonial, as per our current GG) --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:15, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

It leans more towards the republican than the monarchist by process of implementation. A constitutional change of this magnitude is only able to come about from a referendum, and such a referendum is most likely to be a recurrence of the republicanism issue. That said - is a Governor-General-style head of state worth the expenditure of public money? The system doesn't gain much by having one, and historically the only time they've had any real influence they've caused a constitutional crisis. Do the powers of head of state cause any issues if held by a Prime-Minister-equivalent? -Unreason

Indeed, I agree there would be a republican bias to implementation. The constitutional crisis though was largely due to the GG and the PM being able to (theoretically) mutually dissolve the other. A head of state as we have now doesn't do much, but is that due to their own existance, or in spite of it? Also, this system doesn't suffer from that crisis of mutual destruction. Maybe the question is - are we rebuilding all the components of a westminster system (which is largely how I've seen it so far, though it may well be so far divergent that it no longer qualifies for that nomenclature), or rebuilding _everything_ from the ground up (a much more ambitious and vague project, in which case we'd not need to limit ourselves to two houses... etc... --•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:50, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

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Nemo's theory of representation/proportional government

This is adhoc rambling...

The problem with representing people is how you organise the structure by which you choose people who will do it. There are strong and valid arguments towards two methods, as far as I can think of...

• Representation - where each member is chosen to represents a distinct area of country (as defined by population size (as we do now), area, or possibly other arbitrary method.)
• Proportional - where members are chosen proportionally relative to the total votes, ensuring that parties that gain substantial vote, but never enough to win a representative seat, still gain a "fair say".

The problem with any system is, in a nutshell, anyone who has strong feelings towards one method or the other, will argue that the other method is simply not democratic. (representative? pfft, minor parties don't get a look in. Proportional? pfft, nobody represents my LOCAL CONCERNS!).

What we have in Australia now is a mix of these two - govt from representatives, and senate from state based proportional. (while noting that the 'states' themselves are simply a different representative area)

The House of States idea introduced true proportionality, and also true state representation in government, but at the expense of local representation. Will this be a problem? Should local council areas be doing the job of local representation (arguably, they should), and communicating those representative concerns to state governments better?--•••/Nemo (talk • Contributions) 06:50, 16 August 2011 (UTC)